Rules-based fiscal policy in France, Germany, Italy, and Spain /
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| Imprint: | Washington, DC : International Monetary Fund, 2003. |
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| Description: | 1 online resource (v, 46 pages) : illustrations |
| Language: | English |
| Series: | Occasional paper ; 225 Occasional paper (International Monetary Fund) ; no. 225. |
| Subject: | |
| Format: | E-Resource Book |
| URL for this record: | http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/12500694 |
| Summary: | Fiscal rules can help to counteract the deficits and spending biases that too often originate in the political process. Rules that constrain spending--rather than the balance--allow fiscal policy to be countercyclical. Yet the design of effective spending rules is by no means straightforward. Should a rule be real or nominal? How comprehensive should the definition of spending be? What safeguards ensure the credibility of a rule? How do rules work in decentralized systems where regions and states are partially autonomous? France, Germany, Italy, and Spain--countries that could benefit from more emphasis on fiscal rules to constrain spending--are explored here as case studies. |
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| Physical Description: | 1 online resource (v, 46 pages) : illustrations |
| Bibliography: | Includes bibliographical references (page 522). |
| ISBN: | 1589062167 9781589062160 1452750017 9781452750019 1462355234 9781462355235 1452747970 9781452747972 |