Hidden Bibliographic Details
| Other authors / contributors: | International Monetary Fund. African Department.
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| ISBN: | 1455233579
9781455233571
9781455280063
1455280062
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| Notes: | "February 1997."
Includes bibliographical references (page 18).
Restrictions unspecified
Electronic reproduction. [Place of publication not identified] : HathiTrust Digital Library, 2014.
Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212
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Print version record.
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| Summary: | Annotation Fund member countries that adopt market-friendly policies often encounter a credibility problemmarket-friendly policies are not effective in stimulating private investment as long as there remains a significant risk of policy reversal. the root of this risk lies in the discretionary policy-making authority of governments. Committing to a program with the Fund, and endorsing its conditionality, is one instrument available to governments to overcome this difficulty. the paper develops this interpretation of conditionality and indicates some of its operational implications for Fund programs.
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| Other form: | Print version: Dhonte, Pierre. Conditionality as an instrument of borrower credibility. [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, African Dept., ©1997
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| Publisher's no.: | MWT11409290
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