Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors: | Lledó, Victor Duarte, author, (IMF staff)
International Monetary Fund. Fiscal Affairs Department, issuing body.
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ISBN: | 9781484329139 1484329139 1484322037 9781484322031
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ISSN: | 1018-5941
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Notes: | "April 2016." At head of title: "Fiscal Affairs Department." Includes bibliographical references (pages 32-35). Online resource; title from pdf title page (IMF.org Web site, viewed April 11, 2016).
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Summary: | This paper studies how fiscal rules interact with the intergovernmental fiscal framework to foster fiscal discipline among European subnational governments. We use political variables describing the fiscal attitudes of the central government as instruments to obtain consistent estimates of the impact of subnational fiscal rules on fiscal balances. The results suggest that the discipline-enhancing effect of fiscal rules is weaker when there are large "vertical fiscal imbalances" that is, large differences in revenue and spending assignments across the different levels of government. These findings imply that separate reforms to reduce excessive vertical fiscal imbalances complement a rules-based fiscal framework that is aimed at fostering fiscal discipline--Abstract.
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Other form: | Print version: Kotia, Ananya. Do Subnational Fiscal Rules Foster Fiscal Discipline? New Empirical Evidence from Europe. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, ©2016 9781484322031
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Standard no.: | 10.5089/9781484322031.001
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