Do subnational fiscal rules foster fiscal discipline? : new empirical evidence from Europe /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Kotia, Ananya, author.
Imprint:[Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, [2016]
©2016
Description:1 online resource (37 pages) : color illustrations.
Language:English
Series:IMF working paper, 1018-5941 ; WP/16/84
IMF working paper ; WP/16/84.
Subject:
Format: E-Resource Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/12505031
Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors:Lledó, Victor Duarte, author, (IMF staff)
International Monetary Fund. Fiscal Affairs Department, issuing body.
ISBN:9781484329139
1484329139
1484322037
9781484322031
ISSN:1018-5941
Notes:"April 2016."
At head of title: "Fiscal Affairs Department."
Includes bibliographical references (pages 32-35).
Online resource; title from pdf title page (IMF.org Web site, viewed April 11, 2016).
Summary:This paper studies how fiscal rules interact with the intergovernmental fiscal framework to foster fiscal discipline among European subnational governments. We use political variables describing the fiscal attitudes of the central government as instruments to obtain consistent estimates of the impact of subnational fiscal rules on fiscal balances. The results suggest that the discipline-enhancing effect of fiscal rules is weaker when there are large "vertical fiscal imbalances" that is, large differences in revenue and spending assignments across the different levels of government. These findings imply that separate reforms to reduce excessive vertical fiscal imbalances complement a rules-based fiscal framework that is aimed at fostering fiscal discipline--Abstract.
Other form:Print version: Kotia, Ananya. Do Subnational Fiscal Rules Foster Fiscal Discipline? New Empirical Evidence from Europe. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, ©2016 9781484322031
Standard no.:10.5089/9781484322031.001