Can Budget Institutions Counteract Political Indiscipline? /

Saved in:

Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:	Mody, Ashoka.
Imprint:	Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, 2006.
Description:	1 online resource (53 pages)
Language:	English
Series:	IMF Working Papers, 2227-8885 ; Working Paper No. 06/123 IMF Working Papers ; Working Paper no. 06/123.
Subject:	Budget -- European Union countries -- Econometric models. Fiscal policy -- European Union countries -- Econometric models. Elections -- Economic aspects -- European Union countries. Budget -- Econometric models. Elections -- Economic aspects. Fiscal policy -- Econometric models. European Union countries.
Format:	E-Resource Book
URL for this record:	http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/12508003

Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors:	Mody, Ashoka. Fabrizio, Stefania. International Monetary Fund.
ISBN:	1451987250 9781451987256 9781451863833 1451863837 9781451987256
Notes:	Available in PDF, ePUB, and Mobi formats on the Internet.
Summary:	The budget is an expression of political rather than economic priorities. We confirm this proposition for a group of new and potential members of the European Union, finding that politics dominates. The contemporary practice of democracy can increase budget deficits through not only ideological preferences but also more fragmented government coalitions and higher voter participation. Long-term structural forces, triggered by societal divisions and representative electoral rules, have more ambiguous implications but also appear to increase budget pressures, as others have also found. However, our most robust, and hopeful, finding is that budget institutions-mechanisms and rules of the budget process-that create checks and balances have significant value even when the politics is representative but undisciplined, and when long-term structural forces are unfavorable.
Standard no.:	10.5089/9781451987256.001

Similar Items