Goal-Independent Central Banks : Why Politicians Decide to Delegate.

Saved in:

Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:	Crowe, Christopher W., author.
Uniform title:	Goal-Independent Central Banks (Online)
Imprint:	Washington : International Monetary Fund Nov. 2006.
Description:	1 online resource (6 pages)
Language:	English
Subject:	Banks and banking, Central. Monetary policy. Banks of issue. Banks of issue Banks and banking, Central Monetary policy
Format:	E-Resource Book
URL for this record:	http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/12508807

Hidden Bibliographic Details
ISBN:	9781451909692 1451909691
Summary:	Annotation A motivation for central bank independence (CBI) is that policy delegation helps politicians manage diverse coalitions. This paper develops a model of coalition formation that predicts when delegation will occur. An analysis of policy preferences survey data and CBI indicators supports the predictions. Case studies, drawn from several countries' recent past and the nineteenth-century United States, provide further support. Finally, the model explains why the expected negative relationship between CBI and inflation is not empirically robust: endogenous selection biases the estimated effect towards zero. the data confirm this.

Similar Items