Rejecting retributivism : free will, punishment, and criminal justice /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Caruso, Gregg D., author.
Imprint:Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, 2021.
Description:1 online resource (ix, 389 pages)
Language:English
Series:Law and the cognitive sciences
Law and the cognitive sciences.
Subject:
Format: E-Resource Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/12574403
Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other title:Cambridge Core
ISBN:9781108689304
1108689302
9781108754804
1108754805
9781108484701
1108484700
9781108723480
1108723489
Notes:Includes bibliographical references (pages 329-383) and index.
Summary:"Within the criminal justice system one of the most prominent justifications for legal punishment, both historically and currently, is retributivism. The retributive justification of legal punishment maintains that, absent any excusing conditions, wrongdoers are morally responsible for their actions and deserve to be punished in proportion to their wrongdoing. Unlike theories of punishment that aim at deterrence, rehabilitation, or incapacitation, retributivism grounds punishment in the blameworthiness and desert of offenders. It holds that punishing wrongdoers is intrinsically good. For the retributivist, wrongdoers deserve a punitive response proportional to their wrongdoing, even if their punishment serves no further purpose. This means that the retributivist position is not reducible to consequentialist considerations nor in justifying punishment does it appeal to wider goods such as the safety of society or the moral improvement of those being punished"--
Other form:Print version: Caruso, Gregg D. Rejecting retributivism. Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, 2021 9781108484701