The epistemic consequences of paradox /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Frances, Bryan, author.
Imprint:Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2022.
©2022
Description:71 pages ; 23 cm
Language:English
Series:Cambridge elements. Elements in epistemology
Cambridge elements. Elements in epistemology
Subject:
Format: Print Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/12761206
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ISBN:1009055968
9781009055963
9781009052948 (PDF ebook)
9781009062138 (PDF ebook)
Notes:Includes bibliographical references (pages [69]-71).
Summary:By pooling together exhaustive analyses of certain philosophical paradoxes, we can prove a series of fascinating results regarding philosophical progress, agreement on substantive philosophical claims, knockdown arguments in philosophy, the wisdom of philosophical belief (quite rare, because the knockdown arguments show that we philosophers have been wildly wrong about language, logic, truth, or ordinary empirical matters), the epistemic status of metaphysics, and the power of philosophy to refute common sense. As examples, the author examines the Sorites paradox, the Liar paradox, and the Problem of the Many -- although many other paradoxes can do the trick too--back cover.
Other form:ebook version : 9781009052948

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Call Number: BC199.P2F73 2022
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