Hidden Bibliographic Details
| Other authors / contributors: | International Monetary Fund.
IMF Institute.
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| ISBN: | 1451904681
9781451904680
1462376088
9781462376087
1452756244
9781452756240
1282107089
9781282107083
9786613800435
6613800430
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| Notes: | Includes bibliographical references (pages 24-25).
Restrictions unspecified
Electronic reproduction. [Place of publication not identified] : HathiTrust Digital Library, 2010.
Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212
English.
digitized 2010 HathiTrust Digital Library committed to preserve
Print version record.
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| Summary: | Does policy conditionality worsen domestic welfare, as governments are forced to attempt unpopular reforms resulting in damaging protests, or does conditionality help implement reforms that otherwise would have been impossible? This paper analyzes these questions. Using a game-theoretic framework, it argues that the impact of conditional aid on welfare is nonmonotonic. Sufficiently conditioned aid can enhance the signaling power of reform announcements, thereby deterring protest and enabling reform. In contrast, inadequately conditioned aid may induce a "weak" government to mistakenly attempt reform, resulting in protest and a worsening of domestic welfare relative to the status quo
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| Other form: | Print version: Ramcharan, Rodney. How does conditional aid (not) work? [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, ©2002
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| Standard no.: | 10.5089/9781451904680.001
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