Hidden Bibliographic Details
| Other authors / contributors: | Veiga, Francisco José, author.
International Monetary Fund. Monetary and Financial Systems Department, issuing body.
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| ISBN: | 1283512955
9781283512954
9781451907308
1451907303
146235890X
9781462358908
1452703744
9781452703749
9786613825407
6613825409
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| Notes: | "September 2005."
Includes bibliographical references.
English.
Print version record.
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| Summary: | While most economists agree that seigniorage is one way governments finance deficits, there is less agreement about the political, institutional, and economic reasons for relying on it. This paper investigates the main determinants of seigniorage using panel data on about 100 countries, for the period 1960-1999. Estimates show that greater political instability leads to higher seigniorage, especially in developing, less democratic, and socially polarized countries, with high inflation, low access to domestic and external debt financing and with higher turnover of central bank presidents. One important policy implication of this study is the need to develop institutions conducive to greater economic freedom as a means to lower the reliance on seigniorage financing of public deficits.
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| Other form: | Print version: Aisen, Ari, 1971- Political economy of seigniorage. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, Dept., ©2005
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