Hidden Bibliographic Details
| ISBN: | 1282649094
9781282649095
9781451909692
1451909691
1462362915
9781462362912
1452782423
9781452782423
9786613822901
6613822906
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| Digital file characteristics: | text file
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| Notes: | Includes bibliographical references.
Restrictions unspecified
Electronic reproduction. [Place of publication not identified] : HathiTrust Digital Library, 2010.
Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212
English.
digitized 2010 HathiTrust Digital Library committed to preserve
Print version record.
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| Summary: | A motivation for central bank independence (CBI) is that policy delegation helps politicians manage diverse coalitions. This paper develops a model of coalition formation that predicts when delegation will occur. An analysis of policy preferences survey data and CBI indicators supports the predictions. Case studies, drawn from several countries' recent past and the nineteenth-century United States, provide further support. Finally, the model explains why the expected negative relationship between CBI and inflation is not empirically robust: endogenous selection biases the estimated effect towards zero. The data confirm this.
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| Other form: | Print version: Crowe, Christopher (Christopher W.). Goal-independent central banks. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, Research Dept., ©2006
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| Standard no.: | 10.5089/9781451909692.001
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