Goal-independent central banks : why politicians decide to delegate /

Goal-independent central banks : why politicians decide to delegate /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:	Crowe, Christopher, author.
Imprint:	[Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, 2006.
Description:	1 online resource (41 pages)
Language:	English
Series:	IMF working paper, 2227-8885 ; WP/06/256 IMF working paper ; WP/06/256.
Subject:	Banks and banking, Central. Monetary policy. Banks and banking, Central. Monetary policy.
Format:	E-Resource Book
URL for this record:	http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/13510819

Hidden Bibliographic Details
ISBN:	1282649094 9781282649095 9781451909692 1451909691 1462362915 9781462362912 1452782423 9781452782423 9786613822901 6613822906
Digital file characteristics:	text file
Notes:	Includes bibliographical references. Restrictions unspecified Electronic reproduction. [Place of publication not identified] : HathiTrust Digital Library, 2010. Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212 English. digitized 2010 HathiTrust Digital Library committed to preserve Print version record.
Summary:	A motivation for central bank independence (CBI) is that policy delegation helps politicians manage diverse coalitions. This paper develops a model of coalition formation that predicts when delegation will occur. An analysis of policy preferences survey data and CBI indicators supports the predictions. Case studies, drawn from several countries' recent past and the nineteenth-century United States, provide further support. Finally, the model explains why the expected negative relationship between CBI and inflation is not empirically robust: endogenous selection biases the estimated effect towards zero. The data confirm this.
Other form:	Print version: Crowe, Christopher (Christopher W.). Goal-independent central banks. Washington, D.C. : International Monetary Fund, Research Dept., ©2006
Standard no.:	10.5089/9781451909692.001

Description
Summary:	A motivation for central bank independence (CBI) is that policy delegation helps politicians manage diverse coalitions. This paper develops a model of coalition formation that predicts when delegation will occur. An analysis of policy preferences survey data and CBI indicators supports the predictions. Case studies, drawn from several countries' recent past and the nineteenth-century United States, provide further support. Finally, the model explains why the expected negative relationship between CBI and inflation is not empirically robust: endogenous selection biases the estimated effect towards zero. The data confirm this.
Physical Description:	1 online resource (41 pages)
Format:	Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002.
Bibliography:	Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN:	1282649094 9781282649095 9781451909692 1451909691 1462362915 9781462362912 1452782423 9781452782423 9786613822901 6613822906
ISSN:	2227-8885 ;