Bank capitalization as a signal /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:	Hardy, Daniel C. L., author.
Imprint:	[Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, ©2012.
Description:	1 online resource (25 pages) : illustrations
Language:	English
Series:	IMF working paper ; WP/12/114 IMF working paper ; WP/12/114.
Subject:	Bank capital -- Econometric models. Bank capital -- Econometric models. Electronic books.
Format:	E-Resource Book
URL for this record:	http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/13510858

Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors:	International Monetary Fund. Monetary and Capital Markets Department, issuing body.
ISBN:	1475586426 9781475586428
Notes:	Includes bibliographical references.
Summary:	The level of a bank's capitalization can effectively transmit information about its riskiness and therefore support market discipline, but asymmetry information may induce exaggerated or distortionary behavior: banks may vie with one another to signal confidence in their prospects by keeping capitalization low, and banks' creditors often cannot distinguish among them -- tendencies that can be seen across banks and across time. Prudential policy is warranted to help offset these tendencies.
Standard no.:	10.5089/9781475586428.001

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