Sub-national credit risk and sovereign bailouts : who pays the premium? /

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Jenkner, E. (Eva), author.
Imprint:Washington : International Monetary Fund, 2014.
Description:1 online resource (30 pages)
Language:English
Series:IMF working paper ; no. 14/20
IMF working paper ; no. 14/20.
Subject:
Format: E-Resource Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/13511120
Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors:Lu, Zhongjin, author.
International Monetary Fund, issuing body.
ISBN:9781484399132
1484399137
1306454670
9781306454674
Notes:Includes bibliographical references.
Print version record.
Summary:Studies have shown that markets may underprice sub-national governments' risk on the implicit assumption that these entities would be bailed out by their central government in case of financial difficulties. However, the question of whether sovereigns pay a premium on their own borrowing as a result of (implicitly or explicitly) guaranteeing sub-entities' debt has been explored only little. We use an event study approach with separate equations for two levels of government to test for a simultaneous increase in sovereign risk premia and decrease in sub-national risk premia?or a de facto transf.
Other form:Print version: Jenkner, E. Sub-National Credit Risk and Sovereign Bailouts: Who Pays the Premium? Washington : International Monetary Fund, ©2014 9781484398876