Hidden Bibliographic Details
| Other authors / contributors: | Vines, David, author.
International Monetary Fund. Fiscal Affairs Department.
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| ISBN: | 1283511630
9781283511636
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| Notes: | Includes bibliographical references (pages 50-52).
Electronic reproduction. [Place of publication not identified] : HathiTrust Digital Library, 2010.
Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212
digitized 2010 HathiTrust Digital Library committed to preserve
Print version record.
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| Summary: | We analyse optimal monetary and fiscal policy in a New-Keynesian model with public debt and inflation persistence. Leith and Wren-Lewis (2007) have shown that optimal discretionary policy is subject to a 'debt stabilization bias' which requires debt to be returned to its pre-shock level. This finding has two important implications for optimal discretionary policy. Firstly, as Leith and Wren-Lewis have shown, optimal monetary policy in an economy with high steady-state debt cuts the interest rate in response to a cost-push shock - and therefore violates the Taylor principle. We show that this striking result is not true with high degrees of inflation persistence. Secondly, we show that optimal fiscal policy is more active under discretion than commitment at all degrees of inflation persistence and all levels of debt.
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| Other form: | Print version: Stehn, Sven Jari. Debt stabilization bias and the Taylor principle. [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, Fiscal Affairs Dept., ©2007
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