Market discipline and financial safety net design /

Market discipline and financial safety net design /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:	Demirgüç-Kunt, Aslı, 1961-
Imprint:	Washington, DC : World Bank, Development Research Group, Finance, [1999]
Description:	44 p. ; 28 cm.
Language:	English
Series:	Policy research working paper ; 2183 Policy research working papers ; 2183.
Subject:	Banks and banking. Deposit insurance. Risk. Banks and banking. Deposit insurance. Risk.
Format:	E-Resource Print Book
URL for this record:	http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/3986046

Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors:	Huizinga, Harry. World Bank. Development Research Group. Finance.
Notes:	"September 1999"--Cover. Includes bibliographical references (p. 28-29). Also available on the World Wide Web.
Summary:	It is difficult to design and implement an effective safety net for banks, because overgenerous protection of banks may introduce a risk-enhancing moral hazard and destabilize the very system it is meant to protect. The safety net that policymakers design must provide the right mix of market and regulatyory discipline, enough to protect depositors without unduly undermining market discipline on banks.

Mansueto

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Call Number:	HG3879.P6 no.2183
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