Central bank independence, targets, and credibility : political and economic aspects of delegation arrangements for monetary policy /

Central bank independence, targets, and credibility : political and economic aspects of delegation arrangements for monetary policy /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:	Lippi, Francesco, 1968-
Imprint:	Northampton, Mass., USA : Edward Elgar, c1999.
Description:	viii, 162 p. ; 25 cm.
Language:	English
Subject:	Banks and banking, Central -- European Union countries. Monetary policy -- European Union countries. Banks and banking, Central. Monetary policy. Europe -- European Union countries.
Format:	Print Book
URL for this record:	http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/4259762

Hidden Bibliographic Details
ISBN:	1858989159
Notes:	Includes bibliographical references (p. 149-156) and index.

D'Angelo Law, Bookstacks

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Holdings details from D'Angelo Law, Bookstacks
Call Number:	HG925.L56 1999
c.1	Available Loan period: standard loan Scan and Deliver Request for Pickup Need help? - Ask a Librarian