Tax evasion, corruption, and the remuneration of heterogeneous inspectors /

Tax evasion, corruption, and the remuneration of heterogeneous inspectors /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:	Wane, Waly.
Imprint:	Washington, DC : World Bank, Development Research Group, Public Economics, [2000]
Description:	35 p. ; 28 cm.
Language:	English
Series:	Policy research working paper ; 2394 Policy research working papers ; 2394.
Subject:	Tax evasion -- Econometric models. Corruption -- Econometric models. Tax administration and procedure -- Econometric models. Tax administration and procedure -- Econometric models. Tax evasion -- Econometric models.
Format:	E-Resource Print Book
URL for this record:	http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/4377749

Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors:	World Bank. Development Research Group. Public Economics.
Notes:	"July 2000"--Cover. Includes bibliographical references (p 35). Also available on the World Wide Web.
Summary:	In an economy where corruption is pervasive, how should tax inspectors be compensated?

Mansueto

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Call Number:	HG3879.P6 no.2394
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