Ownership structure and the temptation to loot : evidence from privatized firms in the Czech Republic /

Ownership structure and the temptation to loot : evidence from privatized firms in the Czech Republic /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:	Cull, Robert J.
Imprint:	Washington, D.C. : World Bank, Development Research Group, Regulation and competition policy, [2001]
Description:	39 p. ; 28 cm.
Language:	English
Series:	Policy research working paper ; 2568 Policy research working papers ; 2568.
Subject:	Privatization -- Law and legislation -- Czech Republic. Corporate governance -- Czech Republic. Corporate governance. Privatization -- Law and legislation. Czech Republic.
Format:	E-Resource Print Book
URL for this record:	http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/4452279

Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors:	Matesova, Jana. Shirley, Mary M., 1945- World Bank. Development Research Group. Regulation and Competition Policy.
Notes:	"March 2001"--Cover. Includes bibliographical references (p.31-33). Also available on the World Wide Web.
Summary:	Evidence from the Czech Republic shows that financial incentives and regulation are as important as ownership in the design of privatization.

Mansueto

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Call Number:	HG3879.P6 no.2568
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