Libertarian paternalism is not an oxymoron /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Sunstein, Cass R.
Imprint:[Chicago, Ill.] : The Law School, the University of Chicago, [2003]
Description:46 p.
Language:English
Series:Public law and legal theory working paper; 43
Subject:
Format: E-Resource Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/6202618
Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors:Thaler, Richard H., 1945-
University of Chicago. Law School.
Notes:Cover title.
"May 2003."
Title from homepage, University of Chicago Law School (viewed on Dec. 22, 2006 )
Includes bibliographical references.
Also available in print.
Electronic reproduction. Chicago, Ill. : Law School, University of Chicago, 2006. Available via the World Wide Web.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.
Summary:"The idea of libertarian paternalism might seem to be an oxymoron, but it is both possible and legitimate for private and public institutions to affect behavior while also respecting freedom of choice. Often people's preferences are ill-formed, and their choices will inevitably be influenced by default rules, framing effects, and starting points. In these circumstances, a form of paternalism cannot be avoided. Equipped with an understanding of behavioral findings of bounded rationality and bounded self-control, libertarian paternalists should attempt to steer people's choices in welfare-promoting directions without eliminating freedom of choice. It is also possible to show how a libertarian paternalist might select among the possible options and to assess how much choice to offer. Examples are given from many areas, including savings behavior, labor law, and consumer protection."