| Notes: | Cover title.
"April 2005."
Title from homepage, University of Chicago Law School (viewed on May 7, 2007 )
From New York law review, v. 79, no. 3 (June 2004)
Includes bibliographical references.
Also available in print.
Electronic reproduction. Chicago, Ill. : Law School, University of Chicago, 2006. Available via the World Wide Web.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.
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| Summary: | "Courts and scholars have operated on the implicit assumption that the Supreme Court's "one person, one vote" jurisprudence put redistricting politics on a fixed, ten-year cycle. Recent redistricting controversies in Colorado, Texas, and elsewhere, however, have undermined this assumption, highlighting the fact that most states are currently free to redraw election districts as often as they like. This essay explores whether partisan fairness - a normative commitment that both scholars and the Supreme Court have identified as a central concern of districting arrangements - would be promoted by a procedural rule limiting the frequency of redistricting. While the literature has not considered this question, scholars generally are pessimistic about the capacity of procedural redistricting regulations to curb partisan gerrymandering. In contrast, this essay argues that a procedural rule limiting the frequency of redistricting will promote partisan fairness by introducing beneficial uncertainty in the redistricting process and by regularizing the redistricting agenda."
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