Hidden Bibliographic Details
| Other authors / contributors: | Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute.
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| Notes: | Title from title screen (viewed on Dec. 7, 2007).
"November 2007."
Includes bibliographical references (page 25).
Mode of access: Internet from the STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE web site. Address as of 12/07/2007: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB823.pdf; current access is available via PURL.
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| Summary: | "In a dangerous world, we need to think very carefully about how military force is used. Game theory can serve us in such analyses by providing a framework for probing the inextricable connections between our adversaries' decision problems and our own. To illustrate the power of game theory, the author focuses on a vital question that confronts American policymakers today: what determines why an application of military force, which was intended to deter potential adversaries, sometimes instead stimulates them to more militant reactions against us? When we feel that force is necessary, what can we do to minimize the risk of such adverse reactions?" -- p. v.
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| Other form: | Myerson, Roger B. Force and restraint in strategic deterrence vi, 25 p.
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| GPO item no.: | 0307-A-53 (online)
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| Govt.docs classification: | D 101.146/14:D 48
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