Force and restraint in strategic deterrence : a game-theorist's perspective /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Myerson, Roger B.
Imprint:[Carlisle Barracks, PA] : [Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College], [2007]
Description:vi, 25 pages : digital, PDF file.
Language:English
Series:Advancing strategic thought series
Advancing strategic thought series.
Subject:
Format: E-Resource U.S. Federal Government Document Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/6811252
Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors:Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute.
Notes:Title from title screen (viewed on Dec. 7, 2007).
"November 2007."
Includes bibliographical references (page 25).
Mode of access: Internet from the STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE web site. Address as of 12/07/2007: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB823.pdf; current access is available via PURL.
Summary:"In a dangerous world, we need to think very carefully about how military force is used. Game theory can serve us in such analyses by providing a framework for probing the inextricable connections between our adversaries' decision problems and our own. To illustrate the power of game theory, the author focuses on a vital question that confronts American policymakers today: what determines why an application of military force, which was intended to deter potential adversaries, sometimes instead stimulates them to more militant reactions against us? When we feel that force is necessary, what can we do to minimize the risk of such adverse reactions?" -- p. v.
Other form:Myerson, Roger B. Force and restraint in strategic deterrence vi, 25 p.
GPO item no.:0307-A-53 (online)
Govt.docs classification:D 101.146/14:D 48

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500 |a Title from title screen (viewed on Dec. 7, 2007). 
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504 |a Includes bibliographical references (page 25). 
505 0 |a Intuitive arguments against multilateral constraints on American actions -- Game theory as a form of analytical narrative -- A simple model of the strategic deterrence problem -- Judging reputations -- Reputations for restraint and resolve -- Failure of deterrence: stimulating militarism by denying restraint -- Reconsidering the rationality assumption -- Lessons for patriots. 
520 |a "In a dangerous world, we need to think very carefully about how military force is used. Game theory can serve us in such analyses by providing a framework for probing the inextricable connections between our adversaries' decision problems and our own. To illustrate the power of game theory, the author focuses on a vital question that confronts American policymakers today: what determines why an application of military force, which was intended to deter potential adversaries, sometimes instead stimulates them to more militant reactions against us? When we feel that force is necessary, what can we do to minimize the risk of such adverse reactions?" -- p. v. 
650 0 |a Deterrence (Strategy) 
650 0 |a Game theory. 
650 0 |a Games of strategy (Mathematics) 
650 0 |a International relations. 
650 0 |a Deterrence (Strategy)  |x Mathematical models. 
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