| Summary: | Hard Lessons reviews the Iraq reconstruction experience from mid-2002 through late 2008. Like SIGIR's previous lessons-learned reports, this study is not an audit. Rather it arises from our congressional mandate to provide "advice and recommendations on policies to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness" in programs created for Iraq's relief and reconstruction. The report presents a detailed chronological history of the U.S. reconstruction program in Iraq, threading together a number of themes that presented themselves during the endeavor, including: 1) the enormous challenges that security problems posed for rebuilding efforts 2) the dramatic and frequently reactive course-changes in reconstruction strategy 3) the turbulence engendered by persistent personnel turnover at every level 4) the waste wrought by inadequate contracting and contract management practices 5) the poor integration of interagency efforts bred by weak unity of command and inconsistent unity of effort.
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