Hard lessons : the Iraq reconstruction experience.

Hard lessons : the Iraq reconstruction experience.

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Bibliographic Details
Corporate author / creator:United States. Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction.
Imprint:[Arlington, VA : Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 2008]
Description:[508] p. : 28 cm.
Language:English
Subject:
Iraq War (2003-2011)
Postwar reconstruction -- Iraq.
Fraud.
Postwar reconstruction.
Waste in government spending.
Iraq.
United States.
Format: E-Resource U.S. Federal Government Document Print Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/7475782
Hidden Bibliographic Details
Notes:Title from PDF caption page (viewed on Dec. 22, 2008).
"For official use only. Draft document - not for further distribution".
Preserved in the OCLC Digital Archive. Harvested from http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PCAAB832.pdf on Dec. 22, 2008.
Includes bibliographical references.
Also available on the Internet.
Also available in the University of Chicago Library Archive.
Printout. [Chicago : University of Chicago Library, 2008]. Downloaded and printed from Web site on December 22, 2008.
Summary:Hard Lessons reviews the Iraq reconstruction experience from mid-2002 through late 2008. Like SIGIR's previous lessons-learned reports, this study is not an audit. Rather it arises from our congressional mandate to provide "advice and recommendations on policies to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness" in programs created for Iraq's relief and reconstruction. The report presents a detailed chronological history of the U.S. reconstruction program in Iraq, threading together a number of themes that presented themselves during the endeavor, including: 1) the enormous challenges that security problems posed for rebuilding efforts 2) the dramatic and frequently reactive course-changes in reconstruction strategy 3) the turbulence engendered by persistent personnel turnover at every level 4) the waste wrought by inadequate contracting and contract management practices 5) the poor integration of interagency efforts bred by weak unity of command and inconsistent unity of effort.

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