Bargaining power effects in financial contracting : a joint analysis of contract type and placement mode choices /

Bargaining power effects in financial contracting : a joint analysis of contract type and placement mode choices /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Rudolph, Kai.
Imprint:Berlin : Springer, 2006.
Description:1 online resource (xviii, 336 p.) : 25 fig., 99 tab.
Language:English
Series:Lecture notes in economics and mathematical systems, 0075-8442 ; 577
Lecture notes in economics and mathematical systems ; 577.
Subject:
Negotiation in business -- Mathematical models.
Contracts -- Mathematical models.
Contracts -- Mathematical models.
Negotiation in business -- Mathematical models.
Format: E-Resource Dissertations Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/8880251
Hidden Bibliographic Details
ISBN:9783540344964
3540344969
9786610701889
6610701881
3540344950 (pbk.)
9783540344957 (pbk.)
Notes:Thesis (doctoral)--Universität, Münster, 2004.
Includes bibliographical references.
Description based on print version record.
Summary:Demonstrates that a firm's financing decision depends among other things on bargaining power considerations and illustrates potential reasons for this dependency. This work is based on a principal-agent analysis where a lender (principal) and a firm (agent) bargain how to finance the firm's risky project.
Other form:Print version: Rudolph, Kai. Bargaining power effects in financial contracting. Berlin : Springer, 2006 3540344950 9783540344957

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