Bargaining power effects in financial contracting : a joint analysis of contract type and placement mode choices /

Bargaining power effects in financial contracting : a joint analysis of contract type and placement mode choices /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:	Rudolph, Kai.
Imprint:	Berlin : Springer, 2006.
Description:	1 online resource (xviii, 336 p.) : 25 fig., 99 tab.
Language:	English
Series:	Lecture notes in economics and mathematical systems, 0075-8442 ; 577 Lecture notes in economics and mathematical systems ; 577.
Subject:	Negotiation in business -- Mathematical models. Contracts -- Mathematical models. Contracts -- Mathematical models. Negotiation in business -- Mathematical models.
Format:	E-Resource Dissertations Book
URL for this record:	http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/8880251

Hidden Bibliographic Details
ISBN:	9783540344964 3540344969 9786610701889 6610701881 3540344950 (pbk.) 9783540344957 (pbk.)
Notes:	Thesis (doctoral)--Universität, Münster, 2004. Includes bibliographical references. Description based on print version record.
Summary:	Demonstrates that a firm's financing decision depends among other things on bargaining power considerations and illustrates potential reasons for this dependency. This work is based on a principal-agent analysis where a lender (principal) and a firm (agent) bargain how to finance the firm's risky project.
Other form:	Print version: Rudolph, Kai. Bargaining power effects in financial contracting. Berlin : Springer, 2006 3540344950 9783540344957

Table of Contents:

Introduction; A Review of Related Research; A Model to Analyze Bargaining Power Effects; Extending the model by an Ex-ante Informational Asymmetry About Contractual Partners' Opportunities; Discussion of the Adopted Approach; Conclusion.