Fixing unfair costs /

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Ben-Shahar, Omri, author.
Imprint:[Chicago, Illinois] : Law School, University of Chicago, 2011.
Description:1 online resource (42 pages)
Language:English
Series:John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper ; no. 552 (2d series)
John M. Olin Program in Law & Economics working paper ; 2nd ser., no. 552.
Subject:
Format: E-Resource Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/8958061
Related Items:Contained in (work): Stanford law review
Hidden Bibliographic Details
Notes:"May 2011."
Article reprinted from: Stanford law review, Volume 63, issue 4 (April 2011), pages 869-906.
Includes bibliographical references.
Title from online title page (viewed January 25, 2013).
Summary:"Various doctrines of contract and consumer protection law allow courts to strike down unfair contract terms. A large literature has explored the question which terms should be viewed as unfair, but a related question has never been studied systematically - what provision should replace the vacated unfair term? How should a distributively unfair contract be fixed? This Article demonstrates that the law uses three competing criteria for a replacement provision: (1) the most reasonable term; (2) a punitive term, strongly unfavorable to the overreaching party; and (3) the minimally tolerable term, which preserves the original term as much as is tolerable. The Article explores in depth the third criterion - the minimally tolerable term - under which the smallest intervention that is necessary is applied. This criterion, which has received no prior scholarly notice, is surprisingly prevalent in legal doctrine. The Article surveys its ubiquity and explores its conceptual and normative underpinnings."