Libertarian separation of powers /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Huq, Aziz Z., author.
Imprint:[Chicago, Illinois] : Law School, University of Chicago, 2014.
Description:1 online resource (32 pages)
Language:English
Series:Public law and legal theory working paper ; no. 464
Public law and legal theory working paper ; no. 464.
Subject:
Format: E-Resource Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/9978480
Hidden Bibliographic Details
Notes:"February 2014."
Includes bibliographical references.
Title from online title page (viewed May 9, 2014).
Summary:"The Constitution's distribution of power among three branches of the federal government is valued because it aims to produce some bundle of valuable social or public goods such as democracy, rights, or welfare. This essay examines the interaction between constitutional structure and those goods a libertarian might pursue. Analyzing the options for both a constitutional designer and a constitutional interpreter, it suggests that first-order preferences over liberty fail to translate into structural design maxims in any mechanical or predictable way."